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Insurance 
by Robert A. Seligson* 
Any discussion of California insurance decisions and devel-
opments in the past year must perforce start with the fall of 
1966, since 1967 was the year in which the insurance industry 
was confronted with greatly expanded rules on the duty to 
defend, the duty to settle within limits and rising above all, 
like a Colossus sprung from the deep, the tortured decision 
of Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Maryland Cas-
ualty Company, 1 which threatened to convert policies written 
for totally different purposes into automobile liability policies 
at the drop of a hat and with nary a premium. 
The Duty to Defeud 
The duty to defend was the first field to occupy the attention 
of the supreme court; the battleground was the case of Gray 
* A.B. 1954, Brown University; LL.B. 
1957, University of California Law 
School, Berkeley. Partner: Bledsoe 
Smith Cathcart Johnson and Rogers. 
Member: State Bar of California; In-
ternational Association of Insurance 
Counsel; National Association of Rail-
road Trial Counsel. Reporter of Deci-
sions, Association of Defense Counsel 
of Northern California. 
1. 65 Cal.2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385, 
419 P.2d 641 (1966). 
CAL LAW 1967 127 
1
Seligson: Insurance
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967
insurance 
v. Zurich Insurance Company.2 Dr. Gray, while driving his 
automobile, almost had a collision with an automobile oper-
ated by Jones. Jones "approached Dr. Gray's car in a menac-
ing manner and jerked open the door,,;3 and Dr. Gray then 
struck Jones. "Jones filed a complaint alleging that Gray 
'willfully and intentionally assaulted' him. ." Gray's 
insurer, Zurich, refused to defend Gray, since its policy ex-
cluded ". bodily injury or property damages caused 
intentionally by or at the direction of the insured."4 Gray 
unsuccessfully defended the case on the theory of self-defense; 
there was a judgment of $6,000 actual damages, but no 
punitive damages. Gray then sued Zurich, claiming a breach 
of its duty to defend. The trial court rendered judgment for 
Zurich; the supreme court reversed and remanded the case 
to the trial court to take evidence solely on the issue of dam-
ages alleged in the complaint, including the amount of the 
judgment in the Jones suit and the costs, expenses and attor-
neys' fees incurred in defending that action. 
The court held that an insurance carrier must defend a 
suit that potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the 
policy and ruled that in determining whether an exclusionary 
clause in an insurance policy will be applied, the question is 
whether the insured might reasonably expect the insurer to 
defend him. The court indicated that an insurer refuses to 
defend only at its peril and stated that the remedy for a 
carrier, which feels that there is no coverage under the policy, 
is to defend on a reservation of right basis and to raise the 
noncoverage defense in a subsequent action afterwards, if the 
injured party prevails in his action against the insured. Not-
withstanding the exclusion in the policy, the court held that 
the insurer was required to pay not only the costs of defense, 
but also the judgment against its insured, apparently on the 
basis that the insurer has more money than the insured and 
can better afford to employ competent counsel to defend 
the case against the insured. 
2. 65 Cal.2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 4. 65 Cal.2d at 267, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 
419 P.2d 168 (1966). 106, 419 P.2d at 170. 
3. 65 Cal.2d at 267 n. 1, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 106 n. 1, 419 P.2d at 170 n. 1. 
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The opinion contained considerable dictum that indicates 
the court's basic attitude toward complicated language and 
the use of "fine print" in insurance policies. The court 
terms an insurance policy an "adhesion contract" and stated 
that obligations arising from such a contract inure not only 
from the consensual transaction but from the relationship of 
the parties. Thus, the duty to defend depends not merely 
on the objective standard of the language in the policy, but 
rather on the subjective standard whether the insured might 
reasonably expect that he is entitled to a defense. 
Lowell v. Maryland Casualty Company5 also involved the 
duty to defend under a comprehensive liability policy. Here 
too the insurer refused to defend an action that alleged that 
the insured unlawfully and maliciously assaulted the plaintiff, 
on the basis that its policy provided that an assault and bat-
tery would be deemed an accident ". . . unless committed 
by or at the direction of the insured."6 The insured prevailed 
in the assault and battery action and then sued the insurer 
for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred in defending 
that suit. The supreme court reversed the lower court's judg-
ment for the insurer and instructed the trial court to take 
evidence solely on the issue of damages. The court rejected, 
however, the insured's claim for recovery of attorneys' fees 
incurred in the action against the insurer, Maryland Casualty 
Company, stating that it saw no more reason for allowing 
plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees in this case than in actions 
for enforcement of other kinds of rights. 
In Stolte, Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Company,7 Seaboard had 
paid judgments to persons injured as a result of the use of 
a crane by Stolte, lessee of the crane from Seaboard's insured. 
Seaboard then sued Stolte on a theory of implied indemnity 
and on a "hold harmless" agreement that appeared in the 
lease. Stolte cross complained, claiming that Seaboard was 
required to provide coverage and defense to the lessee as an 
"additional insured." The court held that even though Sea-
5. 65 Cal.2d 298, 54 Cal. Rptr. 116, 7. 250 Cal. App.2d 169,58 Cal. Rptr. 
419 P.2d 180 (1966). 477 (1967). 
6. 65 Cal.2d at 301, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 
118, 419 P.2d at 182. 
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board would be required to provide coverage and defense for 
Stolte for any liability imposed by way of implied indemnity, 
if that cause of action were dismissed, Seaboard could main-
tain its action on the "hold harmless" agreement. 
The supreme court's decision in Gray v. Zurich was moti-
vated by the court's concern over cases where insurers have 
refused to defend claims that might potentially fall within the 
terms of their coverage. Because of this concern and the 
court's conception of an insurance policy as a public service 
contract, the court ignored the exclusion provision of the con-
tract, which on its face would seem to have covered the situa-
tion presented by the jury's verdict of bodily injury caused 
intentionally by the insured. The subjective standard an-
nounced by the court in determining the duty to defend is one 
that, by its very nature and emphasis upon the reasonableness 
of the expectation of the insured, will unquestionably force 
insurers into taking over defenses that would previously have 
been rejected on a denial of coverage. On balance, the writer 
believes that the court's decision will have a decidedly salutary 
effect. The writer, however, does not feel that the court fully 
appreciates the conflict of interest problems that can and do 
arise under such situations, and he is concerned about the 
misuse and misapplication of the court's decision by parties 
seeking to obtain insurance coverage and defense for actions 
that clearly fall without the scope of the coverage. For exam-
ple, the writer has already observed tenders of defense to 
insurers made by parties charged with attempted murder, 
attempted rape and libel. If the insurer is required to defend 
these and every other kind of criminal and intentional activity 
on the part of its insureds, there will have to be a redefinition 
of the concept of insurance and a corresponding adjustment 
in the rate of premium that must be borne by the pUblic. 
The Duty to Settle Within Limits 
As broad and sweeping as the court's decision was concern-
ing the duty to defend, it was matched by the rules set forth 
in Crisci v. Security Insurance Company,S involving the duty 
8. 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 
426 P.2d 173 (1967). 
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of a liability insurer to settle a claim against its insured within 
policy limits. The supreme court held therein that the test 
for determining whether an insurer considered its insured's 
interests, before rejecting an offer to settle a claim against 
the insured, is whether a prudent insurer without policy limits 
would have accepted the settlement offer. It is not necessary 
to show that the insurer has in any way been guilty of actual 
dishonesty, fraud, or concealment. Liability is imposed on the 
insurer for failure to meet its duty to accept reasonable settle-
ments, a duty included within the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The size of the judgment recovered 
in the personal injury action, when it exceeds the policy limits, 
although not conclusive, furnishes an inference that the value 
of the claim is the equivalent of the amount of the judgment 
and that acceptance of an offer within those limits was the 
most reasonable method of dealing with the claim. The court 
held that the evidence supported a finding of the defendant's 
breach of duty to consider plaintiff's interest in proposed settle-
ments and that the defendant's alleged belief that the claimant 
had no chance of recovery for mental suffering could be found 
to be unreasonable. The facts supporting this reasoning are 
that it appeared that defendant's attorney and the claims man-
ager agreed that an award, if any, to the claimant for psychosis 
would be at least ten times the policy limits; that the defendant 
knew that the claimant's accident could have caused psychosis; 
and that reputable psychiatrists supported the claim. The 
insurer had rejected a $9,000 settlement demand at a time 
when its insured offered to pay $2,500 towards settlement. 
The insurer was only willing to pay $3,000 for the plaintiff's 
physical injuries and was unwilling to pay anything for the 
possibility of a plaintiff's verdict on the mental illness issue. 
The policy limit was $10,000 and the ensuing plaintiff's 
verdict was for $100,000. 
The significant portion of the court's decision concerns the 
argument by an amicus curiae that whenever an insurer re-
ceives an offer to settle within the policy limits and rejects 
it, the insurer should be liable in every case for the amount 
of any final judgment whether or not within the policy limits. 
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In considering this argument, Justice Peters, speaking for the 
court, stated: 
Obviously, it will always be in the insured's interest to 
settle within the policy limits when there is any danger, 
however slight, of a judgment in excess of those limits. 
Accordingly the rejection of a settlement within the limits 
where there is any danger of a judgment in excess of the 
limits can be justified, if at all, only on the basis of inter-
ests of the insurer, and, in light of the common knowledge 
that settlement is one of the usual methods by which an 
insured receives protection under a liability policy, it may 
not be unreasonable for an insured who purchases a 
policy with limits to believe that a sum of money equal 
to the limits is available and will be used so as to avoid 
liability on his part with regard to any covered accident. 
In view of such expectation an insurer should not be per-
mitted to further its own interests by rejecting opportuni-
ties to settle within the policy limits unless it is also will-
ing to absorb losses which may result from its failure to 
settle.9 
The court noted that the proposed rule of strict liability is a 
simple one to apply and avoids the burdens of a determination 
whether a settlement offer within the policy limits was reason-
able. It further stated that the proposed rule would also elim-
inate the danger that an insurer, faced with a settlement offer 
at or near the policy limits, will reject the offer and gamble 
with the insured's money to further its own interests. Finally, 
the court noted that it is not entirely clear that the proposed 
rule would place a burden on insurers substantially greater 
than that which is present under existing law. Considering 
Justice Peters' decision in this case, there seems to be some 
truth in the latter statement. One wonders whether the insur-
ance industry will not have to raise their minimum limits to 
a level sufficient to compensate for the danger of excess judg-
ments. 
9. 66 Cal.2d at 430-31,58 Cal. Rptr. 
at 17, 426 P.2d at 177. 
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The court also held that the insured was entitled to damages 
from her insurer for her mental suffering caused by virtue 
of the insurer's failure to settle the case within limits. The 
court held that an action against an insurer based upon its 
alleged bad faith sounds both in contract and in tort and, 
therefore, the plaintiff may avail himself of the rules of com-
pensation in tort cases and may recover for mental suffering 
occasioned by the tortious conduct of the insurer in failing 
to settle within the policy limits. One who loses his property 
and suffers mental distress as a result of another's tortious 
conduct may recover not only for the pecuniary loss but also 
for his mental distress. This is justified on the basis that 
among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance is 
the peace of mind and security it will provide in the event 
of accidental loss. 
It would seem that the result in Crisci was warranted by 
the facts presented therein since the insurance company did 
not act reasonably. However, the implications and dangers 
presented by the court's decision are again considerable. For 
example, take the situation of a drunken pedestrian who walks 
out into the street in the middle of the block between two 
parked cars directly into the path of a motorist, who though 
traveling within the speed limit, is unable to avoid the acci-
dent. The pedestrian is seriously and permanently injured, 
and the motorist has a minimum limits policy. Must the 
insurer of the innocent motorist offer to settle the claim for 
the policy limits in order to avoid the possibility that the 
plaintiff's severe injuries may induce the jury to render a 
substantial verdict? If a reasonable individual would not 
have succumbed to the threat of a large verdict, then the 
writer does not believe that a reasonable insurer that has 
followed the same course of action should be held strictly 
liable for a judgment in excess of limits. 
General Comprehensive Liability Policy: Automobile Cov-
erage 
The results in Gray and Crisci may be justified on the basis 
that serious problems require dramatic solutions. However, 
the same may not be said of the court's decision in Pacific 
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Employers Insurance Company v. Maryland Casualty Com-
pany,10 which the writer believes to be the worst insurance 
law decision to be rendered by the court in many years. 
In Pacific Employers, the court, relying on California Vehicle 
Code section 16451 11 and Wildman v. Government Employees 
Insurance Company/2 held that a general comprehensive li-
ability policy afforded automobile coverage for an accident 
that occurred away from the premises of the named insured 
and that the policy was required to afford coverage to a per-
mISSIve user. The case involved an accident that happened 
in 1959 during a loading operation at the Libby plant. Pacific 
insured the truck that was being loaded. American Mutual, 
a defendant, had a comprehensive general liability policy on 
the lessor of the forklift that was being used by Libby employ-
ees in the loading operation. The American policy did not 
purport to cover permissive users and excluded liability 
arising from the ownership or operation of "automobiles while 
away from the premises or the ways immediately 
adjoining."13 The court held that the phrase "ways imme-
diately adjoining" was ambiguous and that where a policy 
provided for coverage of liability arising out of a "substantial" 
use of the public ways by an insured's automobile, California 
Vehicle Code section 16451 required coverage "within the 
continental limits of the United States"14 and the statute in 
10. 65 Ca1.2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385, 
419 P.2d 641 (1966). 
11. Cal. Vehicle Code § 16451: "An 
owner's policy of liability insurance shall 
[1] insure the person named therein and 
any other person, as insured, using any 
[2] owned motor vehicle with the ex-
press or implied permission of said as-
sured, against loss from the liability im-
posed by law for damages arising out 
of ownership, maintenance, or use of 
such motor vehicle within the continen-
tal limits of the United States to the ex-
tent and aggregate amount, exclusive of 
interest and costs, with respect to each 
motor vehicle, of ten thousand dollars 
($10,000) for bodily injury to or death 
134 CAL LAW 1967 
of each person as a result of anyone 
accident and, subject to said limit as to 
one person, the amount of twenty thou-
sand dollars ($20,000) for bodily injury 
to or death of all persons as a result of 
anyone accident and the amount of five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) for damage to 
property of others as a result of anyone 
accident." [Emphasis in original.] 
12. 48 CaI.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 
(1957). 
13. 65 Cal.2d at 325, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
at 388-89, 419 P.2d at 644-45. 
14. 65 Cal.2d at 323, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
at 388, 419 P.2d at 644. 
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the Wildman case, supra, required coverage for permissive 
users. The court stated: 
In the instant case there is no question but that the 
forklift is expressly covered, at least as to some opera-
tions including its use on 'ways immediately adjoining' 
the insured's premises. In construing the policy in light 
of this phrase we do not deem it relevant that the policy 
be categorized as an 'automobile' or any other type 
policy. The label is unimportant. What is important is 
whether the policy, whatever its label, provides liability 
coverage to automobiles while operated on a public high-
way. If so, then the carrier has exposed itself to the 
application of the Wildman principle by purporting to 
furnish the crucial coverage.15 
It is interesting to note that in deciding the question of the 
duty to defend in Gray v. Zurich, the court placed great stress 
and importance on the label of the policy. In this case, one 
month later, the court held that the label was unimportant. 
In the aftermath of this decision, numerous claims have 
been made that homeowners' policies; owners', landlords', 
and tenants' policies; and other such policies containing per-
sonal liability endorsements and offering what was thought 
to be limited automobile coverage for the "premises and the 
ways immediately adjoining" are, by virtue of the legal leger-
demain utilized in the Pacific Employers decision, converted 
into automobile policies furnishing coverage for accidents 
occurring miles away from the insured's premises. Con-
fronted by the possibility that their policies might be inter-
preted to be automobile policies, some insurers have deleted 
the coverage that was previously furnished to insureds with-
out additional cost. The public is confused, since it can-
not conceive how a homeowners' policy can be held to be 
an automobile policy. Yet, if the court's decision in Pacific 
Employers is applied literally, the personal liability endorse-
ment contained as a part of the standard homeowners' policy 
could be found to afford automobile coverage without con-
15. 65 Cal.2d at 325-26, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 389, 419 P.2d at 645. 
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sideration having been given to this exposure from an under-
writing standpoint. 
It should be noted that in 1963, the requirements of the 
Financial Responsibility Laws, including California Vehicle 
Code section 16451, were amended so as to apply only to 
certified policies. Inasmuch as the court's decision rested 
in part on the requirement in section 16451 of coverage for 
the "continental limits of the United States," it would seem 
that the decision no longer applies to cases where the policy 
was issued and the accident occurred after September 20, 
1963. At the present time, several superior court decisions 
have already drawn this distinction; and unquestionably the 
point will be decided in the near future by the appellate courts. 
The first appellate court limitation of Pacific Employers 
was handed down in the case of Home Indemnity Company 
v. Mission Insurance Company.I6 In that case, Home had 
issued a comprehensive liability policy which afforded "Auto-
mobile" coverage under Coverage A, and "Except Auto." 
coverage under Coverage B. Because of various endorse-
ments, the court held that the automobile coverage, Coverage 
A, did not apply. Mission claimed that Coverage B of 
the Home policy afforded automobile liability coverage on 
the basis of the decision in the Pacific Employers case. The 
B coverage in the Home policy contained the standard clause 
that stated that the policy did not apply to the use of "auto-
mobiles if the accident occurs away from such premises or 
the ways immediately adjoining.»l7 The court held that where 
the policy purports to cover automobile liability in one part 
and general liability in another, the application of the Pacific 
Employers case would serve to rewrite the policy to the 
exclusion of the specific provisions that were applicable to 
the automobile coverage. The court could not find any 
authority for such procedure, and it refused to apply the 
Pacific Employers case to the Home policy. 
The writer does not believe that there is any sound basis 
for distinguishing the Home case from the situation where one 
16. 251 Cal. App.2d 942, 60 Cal. 17. 251 Cal. App. at 952, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 544 (1967). Rptr. at 552. 
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company has issued both an automobile policy and a home-
owners' policy to the same insured. Nor should there be any 
true distinction between the situation where two different 
companies have written the automobile and homeowners' 
policies. The rationale should be the same, since the insured 
has taken out the automobile policy to protect against auto-
mobile accidents, and the homeowners' policy for an entirely 
different purpose. In Gray v. Zurich, the court indicated 
that the reasonable expectation of the parties was important. 
Clearly, the individual who has paid a nominal premium for 
personal liability coverage under a homeowners' policy should 
not reasonably expect that he has purchased automobile li-
ability insurance for accidents occurring away from the prem-
ises. 
Life Insurance: "Good Health" Provisions 
During the past year, the supreme court decided two cases 
that substantially affect the interpretation of "good health" 
provisions contained in the applications for life insurance 
policies. These cases are Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany v. DevoreI8 and Harte v. United Benefit Life Insurance 
Company.I9 In the Metropolitan case, after the insured exe-
cuted his application for life insurance, which contained a 
"good health" provision, and completed a medical question-
naire, his private physician discovered that he had arterio-
sclerotic heart disease. The insured was not told of his 
condition but was hospitalized for rest for a few days, after 
which he continued his normal activities until his death over 
2 years later. Approximately 1 month after he got out of the 
hospital, the policy was delivered to him, at which time he 
signed an "Application Amendment," which purported to 
ratify the statements in the original application as of the date 
of the amended application. The court held that the amended 
application was ambiguously worded and was reasonably 
understood by the insured to mean that by signing, he was 
confirming the statements therein as of the date of the original 
18. 66 Cal.2d 129, 56 Cal. Rptr. 881, 19. 66 Cal.2d 148, 56 Cal. Rptr. 889, 
424 P.2d 321 (1967). 424 P.2d 329 (1967). 
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application, not the date of the amended one. Furthermore, 
the court held that a "good health" provision does not bar 
recovery where the applicant believes in good faith that his 
health has not materially changed between the time of appli-
cation and delivery. The insured cannot be charged with 
the uncommunicated knowledge of a third person, such as 
his physician. He cannot prevail, however, when a disease 
predated the application, if the latent condition had become 
manifest before delivery and he had knowledge of the serious-
ness of his condition. 
In the Harte case, after the execution of the application for 
life insurance, but before delivery of the policy, the insured's 
doctor discovered that the insured had inoperable cancer. 
The insured's wife was informed, but he was not. He was 
told that he had an obstruction of the bowel but that only 
minor surgery would be required to remove it, that a biopsy 
taken was negative, and that the obstruction would be removed 
and he would "be all right." The court restated the rule set 
forth in Metropolitan and held that although the insured's 
wife was her husband's agent for the purpose of accepting 
the policy, her uncommunicated knowledge was not imputed 
to her husband for the purpose of determining whether he 
acted in good faith, since his good faith had to be determined 
on the basis of whether he had actual knowledge. Moreover, 
the court held that there was no evidence to indicate that 
the agent (the wife) was guilty of fraud to be charged to the 
principal (the husband), since she had not read the appli-
cation and could have been led to believe that liability on 
the policy was conditioned only on medical approval of the 
insurer's examining physician. 
There was also an interesting court of appeal decision in 
the life insurance field, involving concurring causes of injury. 
In Shafer v. American Casualty Company,20 the defendant's 
policy provided that it would pay for the death of the insured 
through accidental means but excluded coverage for death· 
resulting from "disease." The insured had an automobile 
20. 245 Cal. App.2d 1, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
446 (1966). 
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accident that caused a bruise on his arm and shock. At the 
time of the accident, he had a preexisting condition of arterio-
sclerosis in his coronary arteries. He died 2 days after the 
accident from a heart attack caused by coronary thrombosis. 
The court held that the death was caused by a concurrence 
of the shock sustained in the accident and the arteriosclerosis. 
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. The court 
held that the presence of a preexisting disease or infirmity 
will not relieve the insurer from liability if the accident is 
the proximate cause of death. Recovery may be had even 
though a diseased or an in firmed condition appears to have 
contributed to the cause of the death, if the accident sets in 
progress the chain of events leading directly to death, or if 
the accident is the prime or moving cause of the death. 
(;roup Iusurance 
The growth of group insurance obtained by employers 
for their employees has resulted in increasing litigation. Dur-
ing the past year, two significant decisions were rendered 
by the California Supreme Court in this field. In Elfstrom 
v. New York Life Insurance Company/ the court held that 
the employer acts as the agent of the insurer in performing 
the duties of administering group insurance policies. In filling 
out an employee's application and certificate for group insur-
ance and inserting misstatements contained therein as to the 
employee's eligibility for coverage, the employer and its rep-
resentative in charge of administering the group insurance 
policy were held to be agents of the insurer. The employer's 
errors in administration were therefore attributable to the 
insurer. The court noted, however, that an insurer may avoid 
a policy where the insured misrepresents material facts in the 
application to the insurer. 
In Walker v. Occidental Life Insurance Company,2 the 
court held that an insurer issuing a group insurance policy, to 
which is attached the privilege of converting to individual 
insurance within a stated period from the termination of 
1. 67 Ca1.2d -, 63 Ca1. Rptr. 35, 2. 67 Ca1.2d 526, 63 Cal. Rptr. 45, 
432 P.2d 731 (1967). 432 P.2d 741 (1967). 
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employment, is required to give the employee-insured notice 
of such termination either directly or through its employer-
agent. Although the insurer may delegate this task to the 
employer, it may not avoid the responsibility for notification 
simply by routine reliance on a bookkeeping entry of the 
termination date in the employer's record. 
An insurer's wrongful rejection of a dismissed employee's 
application to convert $10,000 of his $22,000 group life 
insurance into individual insurance, did not, on the insured's 
death shortly thereafter, however, entitle his beneficiary to the 
full $22,000 benefit. Although the prompt rejection of the 
smaller application under the mistaken belief that it was 
untimely would have made it futile for the insured, before 
the conversion period in fact expired to apply for the full 
amount available for conversion, there was no evidence that 
he intended or desired to do so. The beneficiary was there-
fore entitled only to $10,000, less the insurance premiums 
that would have been payable had the application been 
granted. 
The Duty of the Insured to Cooperate With the Insurer 
In Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Company,3 the supreme 
court had held that prejudice was no longer presumed from 
an insured's refusal to cooperate with his insurer; and so 
it was claimed that under that decision, it was not necessary 
to cooperate with Allstate. In 1967 the court of appeal 
decided a case which demonstrated that this was not true. 
In Allstate Insurance Company v. King,4 Allstate's insured, 
who was the defendant in a personal injury action, appeared 
at his deposition but failed to appear at the trial. The jury 
rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Allstate then brought 
a declaratory relief action, and the court affirmed the judg-
ment, declaring that the company was not obligated to pay 
the judgment against its insured, since the insured had 
breached the cooperation clause of the policy by his failure 
to attend the trial. The evidence indicated numerous unsuc-
3. 60 Cal.2d 303, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827, 4. 252 Cal. App.2d 755, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
384 P.2d 155 (1963). 892 (1967). 
140 CAl,. LAW 1967 
14
Cal Law Trends and Developm nts, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/7
hlsurance 
cess£ul attempts to Ibcate the insured as well as expert testi-
mony by three well-qualified trial lawyers who testified that 
the defense would be substantially prejudiced by the absence 
of the defendant, particularly where no reasonable excuse 
could be offered for his absence. 
Automobile Insurance: Exclusion of Coverage for Injuries 
to the Insured 
There has been a considerable amount of litigation in the 
past year involving exclusions of coverage in automobile 
liability insurance policies for bodily injuries sustained by 
the insured. In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Frederick,5 
Farmers insured a pickup truck owned by Frederick. The 
Farmers policy afforded coverage for bodily injury liability 
to any person, arising out of the ownership, use, operation, 
and control of the described vehicle. The policy further pro-
vided that coverage did not apply "to bodily injury to the 
insured or any member of the family of the insured residing 
in the same household as the insured."6 The policy defined 
the word "insured" to include "the named insured and his 
relatives"7 as well as permissive users. Frederick, the named 
insured, was injured while he was an occupant in his pickup 
truck at the time it was being operated by a permissive user. 
In a two-to-one decision, the Los Angeles Court of Appeal 
held that the word "insured" referred to the person who actu-
ally drives the vehicle, and consequently, the exclusion did 
not prevent the named insured, Frederick, from recovering 
against a permissive user afforded coverage by the terms of 
the policy. In an excellent dissent, Justice Herndon pointed 
out that the exclusion utilized essentially the same terminology 
found in California Vehicle Code section 16454, which 
provides, "Any motor vehicle liability policy need not cover 
any liability for injury to the assured. ." He further 
argued that the majority's construction of the term "insured" 
(to mean the driver) was senseless, since no exclusion under 
5. 244 Cal. App.2d 776, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7. 244 Cal. App.2d at 779, 53 Cal. 
457 (1966). Rptr. at 458. 
6. 244 Cal. App.2d at 779, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. at 458. 
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a liability policy is required to prevent a person from seeking 
to establish his own liability for his own injuries. Both the 
majority and the dissent recognized that California law pro-
vides that a motor vehicle policy need not cover any liability 
for injury to the insured. 
Since the Frederick decision, the court of appeal has given 
effect to the exclusion in three cases. In Farmers Insurance 
Exchange v. Geyer,S the court applied the exclusion with 
respect to a claim for injuries made by the named insured, 
holding that Vehicle Code section 16454 specifically author-
izes the unqualified exclusion of coverage for injuries to the 
assured, and a policy that excludes coverage to the named 
insured is proper and must be applied. In Farmers Insurance 
Exchange v. Brown,9 the policy provided that it did not apply 
to the liability of any insured for bodily injury to the named 
insured and defined the term "named insured" to include a 
spouse of the policyholder if a resident of the same household. 
Mr. Brown was the named insured, and Mrs. Brown was 
fatally injured while riding in her husband's car. The court 
held that Mrs. Brown was a "named insured" under the pol-
icy, that the exclusion was valid and operated so as to preclude 
coverage for the claims of her heirs for her wrongful death. 
Finally, in Hale v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company/o which involved a collision between husband and 
wife driving the two family automobiles, the court held that 
the claim of the wife against her husband for her own injuries 
was excluded from the policy issued on the car driven by 
the husband. It also rejected the wife's uninsured motorist 
claim, since under both the policy definitions and California 
Insurance Code section 11580.2,11 a vehicle owned by the 
named insured or any resident of the same household does not 
qualify as an "uninsured motor vehicle." 
8. 247 Cal. App.2d 625, 55 Cal. Rptr. 10. 256 Cal. App.2d 206, 63 Cal. 
861 (1967). Rptr. 819 (1967). 
9. 252 Cal. App.2d 120, 60 Cal. Rptr. 11. See 256 Cal. App.2d at 210, n. 4, 
1 (1967). 63 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23, n. 4. 
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Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
Uninsured motorist coverage was responsible for more deci-
sions in 1967 than any other area of insurance law. In Katz 
v. American Motorist Insurance Company/2 the court held 
that where an automobile is insured but the insurer has become 
insolvent after the accident, the automobile is an "uninsured 
motor vehicle" within the meaning of Insurance Code section 
11580.2. The effect of this decision has subsequently been 
modified by the amendment of section 11580.2 to provide 
that the solvency protection under uninsured motorist coverage 
is applicable only to accidents occurring during a policy 
period in which the insured's motor vehicle coverage is in 
effect and where the liability insurer of the tortfeasor becomes 
insolvent within 1 year of such accident. 
Another recent decision has affirmed the proposition that 
California has a statutory policy of uninsured motorist cover-
age and that deviations from the provisions contained in the 
statute will not be permitted. In Lopez v. State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Company/3 the policy contained a provision 
excluding from uninsured motorist coverage a relative who 
owns an automobile. The court held this provision to be 
void as conflicting with the applicable statute and stated that 
the argument that it was reasonable to exclude one who did 
not insure his own car "would better be addressed to the Legis-
lature." 
Several cases were decided involving the I-year statute of 
limitations set forth in California Insurance Code section 
11580.2(h)14 for uninsured motorist claims. In Pacific In-
demnity Company v. Superior Court16 and Republic Indemnity 
12. 244 Cal. App.2d 886, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 669 (1966). 
13. 250 Cal. App.2d 210, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 243 (1967). 
14. Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(h): 
"Prerequisites to suit. No cause of ac-
tion shall accrue to the insured under 
any policy or endorsement provision is-
sued pursuant to this section unless with-
in one year from the date of the acci-
dent: 
(1) Suit for bodily injury has been 
filed against the uninsured motorist, in 
a court of competent jurisdiction, or 
(2) Agreement as to the amount due 
under the policy has been concluded, or 
(3) The insured has formally institut-
ed arbitration proceedings." 
15. 246 Cal. App.2d 63, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
470 (1966). 
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Company of America v. Barn Furniture Mart, Inc./6 it was 
held that the statute of limitations for uninsured motorist 
claims is not affected by those disabilities, such as minority 
and insanity, that toll other periods of limitation. The statute 
of limitations, moreover, is a matter for the court rather than 
the arbitrators provided for under the statute; and it has been 
held error for the trial court to refuse to enjoin a claimant 
from proceeding to arbitration, where it was clear that no 
demand to arbitrate had been made within 1 year from the 
date of the accident. I7 However, where the claimant sent a 
letter to defendant demanding coverage and filed an action 
for declaratory relief to determine coverage within 1 year 
from the date of the accident, she was held to have complied 
with the statute of limitations requirement of formally insti-
tuting arbitration proceedings within 1 year from the date 
of the accident. Is 
Finally, in Fireman's Insurance Company v. Diskin,19 
where the tortfeasor's insurer became insolvent more than 
1 year after the date of the accident, it was held that the 
failure of the claimants either to sue the tortfeasor or to 
institute arbitration proceedings within 1 year from the date 
of the accident barred their claims, despite the fact that the 
accident happened in a state which had a 4-year statute of 
limitations period for suits for personal injuries. 
Reimbursement for Medical Services From Proceeds of Per-
sonal Injury Action 
One of the most frequent criticisms aimed at the tradi-
tional system of handling automobile accident cases today 
is that some people collect twice or even three times for 
their medical expenses while others do not recover at all. 
Multiple recovery of the same bills is permitted under the 
collateral source rule and the refusal to permit subrogation 
to medical payments insurers. In Peller v. Liberty Mutual 
16. 248 Cal. App.2d 517, 56 Cal. 18. See Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. 
Rptr. 609 (1967). Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App.2d 441, 62 
17. See Key Ins. Exch. v. Bragini, Cal. Rptr. 177 (1967). 
250 Cal. App.2d 143, 58 Cal. Rptr. 408 19. 255 Cal. App.2d 598, 63 Cal. 
(1967). Rptr. 177 (967), 
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Insurance Company,20 it was held that an automobile insurer 
which had paid out, under the medical payments provision 
of its policy, was not entitled to subrogate for those payments 
against the tortfeasor. One of the most significant decisions 
in the past year may turn out to be the case of Block v. 
California Physicians' Service,l where California Physicians' 
Service was held entitled to be reimbursed from the proceeds 
of a personal injury action filed by the plaintiff for the medical 
services which California Physicians' Service had already fur-
nished to the plaintiff. The court held that the group service 
agreement, which provided that the member would reimburse 
California Physicians' Service to the extent of the benefits 
conferred, and granted a lien to the extent of the benefits, 
where the member was injured through the act or omission 
of another person, was valid and in conformity with public 
policy. The court held that this was not a subrogation or 
assignment of a personal injury cause of action, since Cali-
fornia Physicians' Service had no rights as against the third-
party tortfeasor, but merely a contractual right against the 
member should he recover. The court noted that California 
Physicians' Service is a nonprofit enterprise sanctioned by the 
legislature for the purpose of providing medical service at 
minimal cost; and it held that the plaintiff should not be 
allowed a double recovery at the eventual cost to the other 
participating members. 
It is not clear whether the result in the Block case will 
apply to organizations other than nonprofit corporations in-
corporated under California Corporations Code section 920l. 
However, the writer believes that if we are to change our 
present system so as to ensure the payment of medical bills 
incurred by injured victims of automobile accidents, an inte-
gral part of the change in our system will have to be the 
abolition of the collateral source rule and the adoption of a 
rule that will permit subrogation by medical payments car-
riers. 
20. 220 Cal. App.2d 610, 34 Cal. 1. 244 Cal. App.2d 266, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 41 (1963). 51 (1966). 
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Conclusion 
The cases decided in the past year demonstrate the need for 
greater consideration by insurers of the interests and rights of 
their insureds and greater understanding on the part of the 
courts of the problems faced by insurers. The field of liability 
insurance is a business; for each extension of coverage and 
broadening of liability, there is a price that the public must 
pay. If the insurer is required to defend, afford coverage 
for, and settle within limits, lawsuits not within the antici-
pated scope of the policy against its insureds, we shall either 
have to foresake our traditional system of tort compensation 
(which the writer certainly does not advocate) or pay an 
ever-increasing amount in premium dollars to cover the cost 
of these expanding rules of law. If homeowners' policies are 
to become automobile policies through transformation at the 
hands of the courts, the companies will either have to elim-
inate automobile coverage entirely or charge a premium that 
is commensurate with the additional risk imposed by the 
courts. 
In its idealism and desire to protect the individual against 
the corporate entity, the courts have adopted new concepts 
and rules which have been painted on with a broad and 
sweeping brush. While change may be desirable and even 
necessary, certainty and stability are also important. It is 
only by having and maintaining rules that are fair to the 
insurer as well as to the insured, to the defendant as well as 
to the plaintiff, that we can best secure and protect the 
interests of the public and guarantee equal justice to all. 
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